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THE EU AND THE NPT: 





Only a few years ago, the idea that the European Union (EU) could become a 
significant actor in the nuclear nonproliferation regime would have met with great 
scepticism. An organisation comprising nuclear weapon states (NWS) along with 
non-nuclear weapons states (NNWS) - some of who are disarmament-minded - 
would have been considered incapable of framing any common response to nuclear 
proliferation. And yet, today we find that the EU is establishing itself as an actor in 
the field of nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and that it 
has even developed a Strategy to guide its endeavours. 
This article will first analyse the EU Strategy against the proliferation of WMD 
and its rationale. It will then look at the consequences for the EU as an actor in 
nonproliferation, particularly vis-à-vis the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and 
consider the prospective role of the EU at the next Review Conference, to be held 
in May 2005. 
Background 
Over the past few years, the European Union has been slowly upgrading its role in 
nuclear nonproliferation.1 With one of the founding treaties of the European 
Communities responsible for nuclear energy (EURATOM), coordination on 
nuclear energy issues started within the European Political Co-operation (EPC). 
This was the predecessor of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). 
After the end of the Cold War, due both to external impulses and to institutional 
improvements in its foreign policy, the EU increased coordination on these issues. 
This has been noticeable in the EU's action in multilateral fora and, to a lesser 
degree, in its involvement in international responses to regional proliferation 
issues. Specifically in the nuclear field, the EU has established a tradition of 
coordinating positions and delivering joint statements at multilateral fora, such as 
the First Committee of the UN General Assembly or the NPT Review Conferences. 
Beyond that, it has conducted diplomatic campaigns to promote the indefinite 
extension of the NPT at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the entry 
into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), which was opened for 
signature in 1996.2 The Union has also been very active on promoting the adoption 
of the Hague Code of Conduct on ballistic missiles.3 On a more practical level, it 
runs Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) activities in support of disarmament and 
nonproliferation in Russia, and it also contributes to the North Korean Energy 
Development Organisation (KEDO).4 Taken together, these activities show how 
the EU was already in the process of developing a role in nonproliferation prior to 
the adoption of a strategy in 2003. 
Mobilising the EU Against Proliferation 
After some years of undertaking dispersed non-proliferation efforts almost by 
stealth, the EU decided to publish an "EU Strategy against the Proliferation of 
WMD". This was adopted in a preliminary form in June 2003, and in its definitive 
version at the European Council six months later.5 This is a sui generis document. 
It does not correspond to any of the formal instruments of the CFSP - it is neither a 
Common Position, nor a Joint Action, nor a Common Strategy. While not legally 
binding, it features one peculiarity normally absent from political declarations: it 
foresees a constant revision and updating process as well as the regular production 
of progress reports. Even though the Member States preferred not to formalise the 
Strategy as a "Common Strategy", the provision for a review mechanism points to 
a determination to give appropriate follow up to the measures agreed. 
The Strategy was adopted simultaneously with the European Security Strategy 
(ESS) at the European Council meeting in December 2003, thereby emphasising 
the linkage between both documents.6 It is structured in three chapters: the first 
describes the threat posed by the proliferation of WMD; the second sets out three 
general principles that will guide the EU's response; and the third constitutes a plan 
of concrete measures. 
Chapter II outlines the EU approach for confronting the threats, including the 
pledge to mainstream nonproliferation in its overall policies "drawing upon all 
resources and instruments available to the Union". It also names these tools and 
sets out the order in which they will be used through a metaphor reminiscent of 
battlefield tactics: "Political and diplomatic preventative measures (multilateral 
treaties and export control regimes) and resort to the competent international 
organisations form the first line of defence against proliferation. When these 
measures (including political dialogue and diplomatic pressure) have failed, 
coercive measures under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and international law 
(sanctions, selective or global, interceptions of shipments and, as appropriate, the 
use of force) could be envisioned."7 
Following that, three main principles are presented: "effective multilateralism", 
"promoting a stable international and regional environment" and "cooperation with 
partners". The first emphasises the EU's commitment to the multilateral treaty 
system, whose implementation and universalisation it pledges to pursue. It is 
nevertheless conceded that "if the multilateral treaty regime is to remain credible, it 
must be made more effective". Clearly, if tactfully, intended to offer an alternative 
to the Bush administration's unilateralist policies, this is the idea that seems to be 
encapsulated in the EU-coined term "effective multilateralism". It then lists a 
number of improvements to be made to the existing regime, such as reinforcing 
compliance, perfecting verification mechanisms, and strengthening export controls. 
The section on "promoting a stable regional environment" states that the EU will 
pursue efforts to foster regional security arrangements. It intends to do so on the 
assumption that "the best solution to the problem of proliferation of WMD is that 
countries should no longer feel they need them". It is however acknowledged that 
problems of regional instability will not be easy to resolve in the short term; 
therefore, the policy of the EU will be to prevent proliferation while dealing with 
the underlying causes. Finally, a third section calls for close co-operation with key 
partners.8 
Chapter III then presents an "action plan" of concrete measures through which the 
EU intends to put into practice the principles spelled out in the previous chapter. 
These measures correspond to the headings of Chapter II. For example, "effective 
multilateralism" incorporates the following themes: promoting the universalisation 
of multilateral treaties; enhancing the expertise of the UN Security Council; 
providing financial and technical support to verification regimes; strengthening 
export controls; enhancing the security of proliferation-sensitive material; and 
strengthening the interception of illegal trafficking. 
The rubric corresponding to "promoting a stable international and regional 
environment" includes the expansion of CTR programmes and the integration of 
nonproliferation concerns into the EU's external relations. This section foresees the 
introduction of a nonproliferation clause in agreements with third countries. 
Finally, a brief additional heading on the development of new structures within the 
EU follows a short section on cooperation with other partners - among which the 
United States is singled out. 
The vast majority of the measures suggested in Chapter III are geared towards the 
improvement of legislation, practices and coordination between Member States, 
the establishment of external assistance programmes, as well as some proposals to 
be put forward in international forums. Depending on whether the proposals are 
purely of EU-internal nature, bilateral or multilateral, they would be implemented 
by means of legislation, the release of financial resources, diplomatic means, or a 
mix of all three. 
It should be noted that the new members of the EU were required to adopt some 
practices of the Member States that had not yet been formalised - notably in the 
field of export controls - constituting, therefore, some sort of unspoken acquis 
communautaire. 
The Strategy's Rationale 
In order to understand why the Strategy came about at this particular time and with 
these specific elements, it is essential to consider the circumstances surrounding its 
emergence. 
First, the WMD regimes found themselves in a period of serious crisis, largely due 
the neglect and effective relinquishment of arms control by the current US 
administration. At the core of US policy in the aftermath of September 11 2001, 
was an increased concern that terrorist organisations could gain access to WMD, 
combined with the perception that the existing regimes were ill-equipped to 
prevent proliferation threats, which were thought to require a more forcible 
response. As a consequence, the WMD nonproliferation regimes were deprived of 
the leadership of the major international player. 
Secondly, the United States was intent on promoting a doctrine of "preventive 
defence". This was employed to justify the use of force against one country, Iraq, 
largely on the basis of its alleged possession of WMD. US policy provoked a 
profound disagreement over the necessity of conducting a military campaign 
against Iraq, dividing Europeans amongst themselves and causing serious rifts in 
the transatlantic partnership represented by NATO. 
It was in this context that Sweden proposed that the EU should articulate a 
common approach for dealing with the threat of proliferation. The initiative met 
with acceptance in the Council of the EU, which perceived a pressing need to find 
some common understanding in order to avoid the recurrence of a débâcle of the 
proportions of that witnessed over the Iraq war. The framing of an EU Strategy 
thus arose primarily from the need to restore both a transatlantic and an intra-
European consensus on security issues. The question at stake here is whether 
proliferation can be averted through the multilateral regimes, or whether they need 
to be replaced by other tools. With the adoption of the Strategy, the EU positioned 
itself clearly in favour of the multilateral treaty system: the core message of the 
document is that the regimes can be effective if properly implemented. The 
measures proposed by the Strategy are therefore geared to improving the 
effectiveness of the regimes by stopping up the loopholes. By volunteering to 
strengthen the regimes, the EU is hoping to convince the US that they can work. 
Since the well functioning of the regimes is highly unlikely without the 
participation of the main world power, however, the ultimate objective of the EU 
appears to be to re-engage the US in this process. 
Novelty and Continuity in the Strategy 
The Strategy presents important new approaches. It provides for what was missing 
so far, i.e. the political prise de conscience that nonproliferation should be 
prioritised within the EU agenda. Remarkably, it pledges to utilise the entire range 
of instruments at its disposal to pursue this goal. Non-proliferation had never 
ranked so high in the EU's agenda before, and, needless to say, the Union has never 
totally mobilised its tools in pursuance of such an objective. 
Notably, the Strategy mentions two coercive measures that the EU has not 
previously employed in nonproliferation: sanctions and the use of force. While it 
may be considered a breakthrough for the EU to contemplate the use of force to 
address proliferation, it is important to note that this is conditioned on the 
exhaustion of all other possible means, and on its conformity with international 
law. As for sanctions, the recently adopted "Principles on the use of restrictive 
measures (sanctions)" does little more than reiterate the EU's willingness to impose 
sanctions always in compliance with international law and the UN Charter 
principles.9 The third coercive measure envisioned, the interception of illegal 
shipments, is identified with the US-launched Proliferation Security Initiative 
(PSI).10 
Finally, a central novelty is the introduction of conditionality in the form of 
a Nonproliferation clause, or WMD clause, whose modalities were decided in 
November. Modelled on the EU's "Human Rights clause", which makes 
Community development aid conditional on respect for human rights by the 
recipient state, this provision is to be inserted as an essential element in contractual 
agreements between the EU and third countries.11 The principle of conditionality is 
that that the provision of development aid by one party is made dependent on the 
fulfilment of a number of conditions by the other. In the case of the 
nonproliferation clause, these conditions have been defined as an agreement by the 
parties to cooperate and to contribute to countering the proliferation of WMD and 
their means of delivery through full compliance with and national implementation 
of their existing international treaty obligations. In addition, on a case by case 
basis, the accession to new treaties and the establishment of export controls and 
criminal sanctions against breaches can be also considered subject to 
conditionality.12 A regular political dialogue on these topics is also foreseen when 
making agreements with third countries. 
The EU has indeed a long experience in implementing conditionality in the field of 
human rights. As a tool for influencing the behaviour of target countries such 
conditionality has been shown to display a deterrent effect. Additionally, it is a 
fairly flexible instrument as it remains within the discretion of the Council to 
determine whether progress made in a particular field can be considered 
satisfactory or not. However, the use of conditionality to advance nonproliferation 
in the EU's relations with developing countries is likely to be more controversial. 
Whereas the link between development and human rights is evident, no such link 
has been established between development and the non-acquisition or 
nonproliferation of WMD.13 
In general, the Strategy contains measures that build on the previous experience of 
the EU, either expanding or reinforcing activities and practices that were already in 
place. This is the case with the CTR programme in the Russian Federation. In the 
same vein, diplomatic campaigns have been previously used as a tool for 
promoting the signing of the CTBT and the extension of the NPT, and will now be 
used to promote adherence to the IAEA Additional Protocol. Where new measures 
have been proposed, they link up in most cases with the existing ones. Building 
upon the wealth of experience that the EU has in its programmes of technical 
assistance to third countries, assistance will now be provided to enhance the 
effectiveness of their export controls. 
At first sight, it looks like measures geared towards strengthening the multilateral 
treaty system predominate in Chapter III, given the length of this section. 
However, a substantial part of the measures listed under the rubric 
"multilateralism" do not correspond to the multilateral treaty regime stricto senso. 
This is the case for the provisions on strengthening export controls, which feature 
prominently in the document, as well as the measures on interception of illegal 
shipments of nuclear materials. Such measures are not universally agreed, and it 
must be recalled that EU proposals to acknowledge their role in the 
nonproliferation regime met with resistance at the last NPT Review Conference. 
Interestingly, in some cases the EU has opted for advancing the same objective 
through both the multilateral track and by non-multilateral means. It attempts to 
organise a global diplomatic campaign to promote the signing of the IAEA 
Additional Protocol, while at the same time it will make adherence to the Protocol 
a condition for supply for nuclear materials. In conjunction with the United States, 
it also plans to propose to the Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG) to adopt the same 
policy once agreement has been reached on the modalities. 
Implementing the Strategy 
Only one year after the adoption of the draft Strategy, it is noticeable that it has 
given rise to an amazing level of activity within the EU, and is being implemented 
at a surprisingly high speed. Action has been taken on virtually all measures 
suggested, although progress has taken place more smoothly in some areas than in 
others. Some approaches have been translated into legal instruments. These include 
a Council Directive on the control of high-activity sealed radioactive sources and 
orphan sources,14 a Joint Action on support for IAEA activities under its Nuclear 
Security Programme, as well as a Common Position on the universalisation and 
reinforcement of multilateral agreements in the field of WMD.15 In addition, the 
Common Position on the promotion of the CTBT and the Joint Action on the CTR 
programme in the Russian Federation have been extended.16 A number of 
initiatives in the pipeline can be expected to be finalised soon, including a global 
démarche on the universalisation of the IAEA Additional Protocol. 
It must be noted, though, that the vagueness of some provisions makes it possible 
to report some kind of progress, even if this is only marginal to the stated goal. 
Take, for instance, the pledge to foster the role of the Security Council: it is 
debatable to what extent this is fulfilled just by passing Resolution 1540 
prohibiting the transfer of WMD materials to non-state actors.17 
In a remarkable exercise of transparency, the Progress Report produced by the 
Council Secretariat even points to specific areas where implementation is 
unsatisfactory or slow.18 These include the impending creation of a Community 
budget line for nonproliferation and disarmament of WMD, the establishment of a 
Monitoring Centre for overseeing the implementation of the Strategy, and the 
failure of some Member States to communicate denial information to new EU 
members. 
In any case, progress has been most spectacular in the field of export controls. 
Among others, the EU has successfully promoted the inclusion of catch-all 
mechanisms in all regimes as well as the acceptance of all new EU Member States 
in the NSG, and it plans to propose modernising the regime's outreach activities. 
Internally, it has agreed a peer review process to disseminate "best practices" 
among Member States. It also plans to put in place an assistance programme on 
export controls for Russia and is already discussing one for China. 
Interestingly, it appears that it has been the US-launched initiatives which are 
being implemented most swiftly. This is true for PSI, which was recently endorsed 
by the EU in a press release,19 and the introduction of national legislation 
criminalising the illicit trafficking of nuclear materials.20 Other US-initiated 
proposals are also being adopted into the transatlantic agenda. These include 
support for stopping the transfer of enrichment and reprocessing technology to 
countries that do not yet have these plants, the creation of a special committee of 
the IAEA Board of Governors to focus on compliance, and the suspension of 
IAEA membership for states undergoing investigation.21 
A comparison of this year's joint statement on the proliferation of WMD with that 
issued at last year's EU-US summit shows how co-operation has increased and 
confirms that when EU and US interest converge, action is taken expeditiously. 
The straightforward character of their means of implementation - national 
legislation or the mere consent of the government concerned - facilitate their early 
adoption. In the case of the establishment of criminal sanctions against the illicit 
trafficking of WMD sensitive material, it even proved easy to translate the 
initiative into Security Council Resolution 1540. Beyond these favourable 
conditions, though, the wealth of the joint initiatives also manifests how the Union 
is prioritising cooperation with the US. 
The EU and the 2005 NPT Conference 
On the basis of the above analysis, how does the newly upgraded role of the EU in 
nonproliferation position it with regard to next year's NPT Review Conference? In 
order to assess the prospective contribution of the EU to the Conference, it is worth 
having a look at those measures contained in the Strategy that are relevant for the 
NPT, as well as at the statement delivered at the general debate in the last 
Preparatory Committee (PrepCom). Prior to the 2000 Review Conference, the EU 
adopted a Common Position with a comprehensive catalogue of measures aimed at 
promoting the "successful outcome" of the meeting by "help[ing] to build 
consensus on substantive issues".22 On the basis of that document, the EU was 
indeed able to play a notable role in the eventually successful Conference.23 A 
similar instrument will probably be agreed soon for 2005, especially since the 
European Parliament, in its attempt to acquire an ever more prominent profile in 
security issues, has encouraged the Council to increase its efforts to promote a 
positive outcome at the next Review Conference.24 
In essence, the EU statement at the last PrepCom consisted of a review of recent 
developments relevant to the nuclear nonproliferation regime, along with some 
substantive points taken directly from the Strategy. Following the EU's usual 
practice in drafting statements, the text of the statement was almost identical to that 
of the previous year. 
Accordingly, the EU emphasises its commitment to the preservation of integrity of 
the NPT, reiterates its support for the final document of the 2000 Review 
Conference and Decisions and Resolution of the 1995 Extension and Review 
Conference. The statement singles out five issues that the EU intends to advance at 
the Conference. The first is the promotion of the signature and ratification of the 
CTBT. In fact, the EU has been lobbying for this objective for some years now, as 
formalised in consecutive Common Positions. As a result of the Common Position 
on the promotion of multilateral agreements adopted last November, it looks as if 
the Union has intensified its campaign over the last months, for which it credits 
itself in the statement. 
A second measure to be pursued is the negotiation of a Treaty banning the 
production of fissile material (FMCT), which is mentioned in connection with the 
continuing stalemate in the Conference on Disarmament (CD). However, to the 
surprise of some, language on the CD's impasse has been relaxed in comparison to 
last year, perhaps out of deference to the United States, which is equivocating on 
the issue. Reference is also made to the importance of the principles of 
irreversibility and transparency, but this paragraph remains fairly vague, with no 
specific proposal made as to how or where exactly the EU expects these principles 
to be implemented. 
There are two further topics on the EU's list that are likely to occupy a central 
place in next year's discussions: the issue of non-strategic nuclear weapons and 
security assurances. As far as security assurances are concerned, the EU 
emphasises that they "can play an important role", since they can serve both as an 
"incentive to forego the acquisition of WMD and as a deterrent". The Strategy does 
not go beyond pledging to promote their "further consideration". Indeed, this 
wording is less concrete that the reference in the 1995 "Principles and Objectives" 
NPT document, which suggested that "steps...to assure non-nuclear-weapon States 
party to the Treaty" could take the form of an "internationally legally binding 
instrument".25 The lack of a concrete proposal might signal that the EU, still 
lacking internal consensus on the question, will be satisfied with the mere inclusion 
of this issue on the agenda. 
Concerning the reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons, there has been some 
evolution in the EU's language. Previous to the adoption of the final document of 
the 2000 NPT Review Conference, the EU Common Position merely underlined 
"the importance of non-strategic nuclear weapons in the framework of nuclear 
arms reduction efforts". The clearer reference eventually included in the "13 Steps" 
combined an earlier Finnish position that came to be included in an EU working 
paper in 1999-2000 with a long-standing demand from the New Agenda Coalition 
of seven non-nuclear weapon states, including two EU members: Ireland and 
Sweden.26In its statement before the 2004 PrepCom, the EU encouraged the "states 
concerned" to start negotiations on an effectively verifiable agreement to best 
achieve the greatest reductions of this weapons. Following that, the relevance of 
the principles of irreversibility and transparency is repeated. 
Here, the EU is applying a most discrete diplomatic and rhetorical device in which 
the paragraph following a particular provision is meant to qualify what has been 
asserted immediately before, even though it does not refer to it explicitly. The 
emphasis on the need for transparency and irreversibility insinuates that the EU 
would like the reductions of non-strategic weapons to be irreversible and 
transparent, as well as verifiable. The sensitivity on this issue arises primarily from 
the EU's ambiguous situation, since some countries still host or possess tactical 
nuclear weapons. The fact that several EU states site this type of weapons on their 
soil under NATO's nuclear sharing arrangement, and that they form part of 
France's arsenal is no doubt the main reason preventing the EU from making this 
vague formulation more concrete. This sensitivity also explains the fact that the EU 
mentioned the reduction of tactical weapons in the PrepCom general debate, but 
not in the Strategy.27 
Notably, the EU's list does not present anything to challenge last year's statements 
or the priorities set for the 2005 Review Conference. All five measures identified 
for EU action were part of the Common Position prepared for the 2000 Review 
Conference, and they had been included in the Final Document and the "13 Steps" 
adopted by consensus at the time. In the case of the CTBT and the FMCT, 
consensus on their desirability was already achieved at the 1995 Review 
Conference.28 All these issues are taken from a pre-agreed agenda, and it appears 
that the EU is limiting itself to facilitating their implementation, rather than 
moving ahead with crafting new measures. 
Implications of the EU's Expanded Role 
Through the inclusion of non-proliferation on its agenda, the EU has now allocated 
itself an issue area that would formerly have been regarded as falling within the 
realm of NATO. As outlined above, there is a strong transatlantic significance to 
the Strategy: it positions Europe vis-à-vis the United States as an advocate of 
multilateral approaches to tackle the WMD proliferation. As such it signals not 
only to the current administration, but to the US leadership that will emerge after 
the November presidential elections. 
There is a risk, though, that the WMD issue is approached primarily as a 
transatlantic issue rather than for its own sake. When confronted with the necessity 
to frame a stance for the upcoming NPT Review Conference, it appears that the 
Strategy contains hardly anything new to put forward in an NPT context. The 
Strategy's comprehensiveness is only apparent. It concentrates heavily on non-
multilateral issues such as PSI and export controls, which are unpopular with many 
NPT parties, while it contains very few measures on disarmament. Its bias is, after 
all, clear in its name - a Strategy against proliferation. This can be explained by 
the fact that while everybody agrees that non-proliferation should be avoided, the 
necessity of disarmament, and especially how exactly to carry it forward, is far 
more contentious. Here, the fact that two key EU members are NWS is crucial. In 
addition, the marginalisation of disarmament is partly due to the fact that the 
Strategy was designed with a transatlantic objective in mind. To avoid internal 
conflict over disarmament measures, the EU has resorted to the catalogue that it 
prepared for the last Review Conference. 
The need for a more balanced approach 
In conclusion, despite the fanfare, the Strategy provides the EU with a rather 
meagre basis on which to contribute to the success of the upcoming NPT Review 
Conference. This is not to say that, with the short catalogue of proposals it intends 
to put forward, prospects for the EU to play a substantial role in building consensus 
in the upcoming conference are necessarily bad. The recent activities of the EU do 
include some commendable initiatives such as those involving the release of 
funding to verification regimes and enhancing the protection of proliferation-
sensitive materials, and the measures it intends to advance at the Conference 
already enjoy overwhelming support. 
Yet most of the initiatives taken so far, especially together with the United States, 
have had the effect of placing increasing obligations on the NNWS, with much less 
attention devoted to disarmament, a fundamental element of the nonproliferation 
exchange.29 In the NPT context, though, the bulk of the interlocutors are NNWS, 
whose concern about decades of inadequate progress in implementing the 
disarmament commitments by NWS ought also to be addressed. For a Union 
whose stated objective is "to preserve the integrity of the Treaty", there is a need to 
tackle this fundamental imbalance. 
It is regrettable, therefore, that one year after the drafting of the Strategy, the EU 
has made such poor progress in firming up and expanding its initiatives for 
disarmament. There is an ironic aspect to this modest progress, especially since the 
document was drafted with the intention of promoting a US move towards 
multilateralism. When implementing the Strategy, the EU has concentrated so 
heavily on ways of working together with the United States that it seems to have 
lost the focus on strengthening multilateralism. 
In the run up to the 2005 Review Conference, the EU should harness its 
mechanisms for coordination and devote greater efforts to identifying ways to 
make practical progress on the disarmament commitments agreed in 2000. The two 
issues mentioned above - the framing of legally binding negative security 
assurances and the elimination of non-strategic nuclear weapons - offer interesting 
opportunities for Europe to play a central role in building consensus at the 
upcoming conference while furthering disarmament objectives. 
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